(((This interesting piece by Patrick Moore pretty well sums up the position of the Balkans and Europe today.)))
BLACK HOLES AND WHITE ELEPHANTS IN THE BALKANS. One truism of postcommunist Europe is that all the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans will sooner or later join the EU and NATO. It seems, however, that the countries of the western Balkans might find themselves in a "black hole" outside the EU for the foreseeable future even if they are surrounded by member states (see "RFE/RL
Balkan Report," December 9, 2005).
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosova, Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia face uncertainty in their hopes to join the
EU. The Brussels-based bloc has a particular attraction for the
countries of the region for three reasons.
First, membership means a seat at the table where decisions
affecting all of Europe are made. The small Balkan states might not
wield much influence, but it is better to be inside looking out than
outside looking in, or so the argument has run.
Second, joining the EU symbolizes the end of the
continent's division and the inclusion of former communist
countries – including war-torn states – in the "rich man's
club." For former Yugoslavs, whose passport was once the only one in Europe with which one could travel freely to the East or West without a visa, it means a return to a normal situation.
It also means an end to the inconvenience and humiliation of having to go through often long procedures for something that was once simple, such as a visit to relatives working in Germany. The importance of visa-free travel for ordinary people in the western Balkans should not be underestimated.
And third, as poorer members of a wealthy organization, the
western Balkan states would be able to look forward to a cornucopia
of subsidies, as well as opportunities for more or less unrestricted
study and work abroad. In short, even if NATO membership will someday provide for these countries' security requirements, joining the EU is still regarded in the region as an essential stage in its rite
of passage into the modern, prosperous, and democratic world.
For Brussels, integrating the western Balkans has long meant
that there will be no "black hole" in the middle of the EU –
especially after Bulgaria and Romania join in 2008 or so – in which
organized crime could flourish. More recently, some Western
governments have come to see EU membership for the western Balkans as a way of keeping out of that region unwelcome but well-funded political, criminal, or religious influences from Russia or the
Middle East. (((Or anywhere, really. In fact those "influences" don't come from nations. They're non-state entities.)))
By offering the prospect of membership, the EU has, moreover,
a powerful lever to influence precisely the kind of changes – called
"reforms" – that it wants to see implemented. Progress has been slow in some countries, but the view from Brussels for years was that it is better to have slow progress than to isolate a potentially
volatile region that is indisputably part of Europe and right on the
doorstep of several member states.
But then on May 29, 2005, French voters rejected the proposed
EU constitution by a clear majority, and Dutch voters did the same by an even larger margin three days later. In both cases, objections to further enlargement of the EU after the admission of 10 new members in 2004 played at least some role in the vote.
One year after those two votes, the EU is none the clearer as
to its goals and how to achieve them. In June 2006, a summit took
place in Vienna, but there was no agreement on any of the key issues, including the fate of the constitution. The only consensus seemed to be in putting off any possible movement on thorny questions until the German presidency in the first half of 2007, or maybe to the French presidency in the second half of 2008.
It was perhaps telling for the newer members – and those who
would like to join – that a joint declaration by the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia was "slapped down," as the
"Financial Times" put it on June 17, by Luxembourg, Germany, and
other, unnamed EU founder states. The five Central European countries had called into question what they regard as their second-class status within the bloc and demonstrated their willingness to work together. Some observers recalled French President Jacques
Chirac's remark about a 2003 declaration by a similar group of
countries, which backed the United States over Iraq. The French
leader said at that time that they had missed an opportunity to "shut
up."
Before and during the summit, several leaders of older member
states made it clear that one cannot speak of enlargement, at least
beyond Romania and Bulgaria, before the growing EU has decided at
least on how it will manage its internal affairs. That would mean
2009 at the very earliest. Consequently, many people in countries
hoping to join that body began to fear that their chances of
obtaining membership within a reasonable time frame have become much slimmer as a result.
This was true for Croatia, which has long sought to convince
itself that its membership on the heels of Romania and Bulgaria was a foregone conclusion. Many people in the western Balkans suspected that the EU was keeping them at arm's length as a pretext for dodging the larger and more controversial question of Turkish
membership. After all, the reasoning in the Balkans went, had not the West Europeans told them for years that integrating such small states would not require much money and effort on Brussels' part?
Meanwhile, antireform forces (((nonstate elements))) in the Balkans took heart, blocking police and constitutional reform in Bosnia. In Serbia, they continue to thwart the arrest and extradition to the Hague-based war crimes tribunal of former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, (((more nonstate elements))) with the result that relations between Belgrade (((fake-state element)))) and Brussels (((post-state element))) are on hold.
The question then arises: if Brussels is unlikely to offer
the western Balkans a serious "European perspective" within a clear
time frame, and if some people in those countries are becoming less
enamored of a EU that does not seem to want them, might it not be
time for the people in the western Balkans to reexamine old beliefs
about the necessary postcommunist rite of passage and look for
alternatives? (((Yep.))) Has not the obsession with EU membership become something of a white elephant, like the EU-sponsored bridge over the Prut River from Romania to Moldova that stood unused for several years for want of a road on the Moldovan side? (((Interesting metaphor.)))
How else might the countries of the region modernize their
economies and expand their markets than with top-down efforts at
nation building and seemingly endless rules imposed from abroad?
Might it not be to their advantage to concentrate first on developing
straightforward free-trade and travel arrangements that would not
involve compromising what for most of them is newly won sovereignty in favor of a distant and unelected bureaucracy?
Some Euroskeptics have long argued that the EU is cumbersome, inflexible, nontransparent, and dominated by Paris and Berlin. Might some other parts of Europe now find themselves faced with an opportunity to develop alternative ideas to the EU model that are simpler, more democratic, and hence more likely to produce clear results and win popular support? After all, there is no better incentive for learning to think outside the box than being denied permission to enter the box. (Patrick Moore)
(((Being from Texas, I never dare to give any political advice to the people of the Balkans, but Patrick Moore's article suggests a bold, exciting new solution. The Balkanians might decide that it's *too much trouble* to be part of an alien bloc of countries like the EU. There are plenty of these small new Balkan states (more all the time), so they could form *their own* bloc of countries.
(((I know this seems a wild idea, but maybe it could be done. First, they'd have to finesse all the ugly religious mayhem between Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, so I'd suggest the bold stroke of simply making atheism the official state policy. This stroke at the root of the troubles would obviously require a new, revolutionary leader – probably a punchy, no-nonsense guy who came up from the working class, with a multi-ethnic background (maybe a Croat Mom and a Serbian Dad) and some tough-minded military experience. )))
(((Under the leadership of this strong man, the new Balkan bloc – I'd suggest the exciting new title "Southern-Slavia" – could found a "Non-Aligned Front" of many other nations. These would be all the "black hole" states that don't belong to NATO, the EU, the NAFTA, the BRIC alliance of Brazil-Russia-India-China, whatever. Everyone would respect Southo-Slavia's bold willingness to forge a third way between all the post-national blocs, and Southoslavia could further assure some domestic social stability with a lavishly-funded health and retirement system.)))
(((It's a visionary scheme, but, really, is it implausible?)))
