Super-reporter Greg Grant has a kickass piece in GovExec about the Army's ambitious but fundamentally flawed Future Combat Systems. That's the $200-billion networked combination of sensors, robots and new lightly armored ground vehicles that Winslow Wheeler from the Center for Defense Information calls a "money-guzzling fantasy of the wizards of the so-called 'revolution in military affairs.'"
Grant argues that FCS grew not out of genuine need for new equipment, but out of "a political battle for taxpayer dollars with the Air Force and Navy in the late 1990s, when the military embraced a questionable vision of warfare fought from a distance with sensors and precision munitions" mounted on thin-skinned, more mobile vehicles.
He continues:
Wary of
FCS's ballooning cost and increasingly skeptical of its underlying assumptions concerning "information superiority," Congress has progressively cut the program's budget. Most recently, the House proposed to slice nearly $900 million from the 2008 request, perhaps signaling the beginning of the end of FCS. But even if the overall program and its vulnerable new ground vehicles go away, many of the smaller components -- including robots, sensors and hybrid-electric technologies -- will survive in other applications, as I reported a couple months back:
In fact, recognizing that FCS is feeding lots of useful bits and pieces into the current force, some managers within the program are arguing for a new, more realistic name
... without the word "future." Other parts of the Army are just screaming for FCS as loudly as they can, calling cuts to the program "a betrayal of our trust to Americans."
-- Cross-posted at Ares
ALSO:
* Army's Future Combat System Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone
* Shady Contract for Army "Future"
* Army "Future" Pricier, Lamer by the Second
* Son of Crusader
* How to Salvage Army's "Future"
* Robo-Wingmen for Chopper Pilots
