http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/975
Link: Tuesday Map: Bombs over Tskhinvali | FP Passport.
*Hmmm. According to this satellite map, it looks like somebody rampaged into South Ossetia and blew the living daylights out of the homes of the local breakaway ethnics.
I wonder if inconvenient truths of this kind impinge much on the thinking of contemporary statesmen. I mean: does Sarkozy look at this kind of stuff and go "huh, how curious," or is his party line already set in stone?
(((Post-conflict situation on the ground in Georgia not looking any too perky.)))
http://www.rferl.org/Content/US_Georgia_Face_Grim_Realities_Going_Forward/1196571.html
(...)
Whether the Georgian president fell into a waiting Russian trap or rashly threw a wholly inadequate force into South Ossetia believing Moscow would not respond, the consequences were disastrous for Georgia, but very negative also for the United States.
The essence of a productive patron-client relationship (especially one involving a Great Power) is that it serve the interests of both parties. Shevardnadze well understood that his obligation in return for aid was not to compromise U.S. interests with Russia. Relations with Moscow were quite poor during his tenure, but Shevardnadze carefully avoided steps that might trigger larger armed conflict and thus present Washington with bad and costly policy choices. The youthful and romantic Saakashvili ran a more honest and progressive administration, but lacked the cynical older statesman's understanding that a client state must protect its patron's interests as well as its own.
New Phase Of Relations
Now, a new phase in U.S.-Georgian relations begins, dominated by four grim realities.
First, the Georgian economy is in dire straits, with many new refugees, damaged national infrastructure, and frightened foreign investors. Only 16 years ago, Georgia verged on mass hunger. It could happen again. Aid (both U.S. and European) is needed, but Tbilisi must also create confidence that investments will be safe from further strife.
Second, the Georgian Army is in tatters, in a society with a vibrant warrior culture. Only 16 years ago, Georgia was ruled by warlords and private armies. It could happen again. The integrity of the Georgian state requires some kind of army, but with confidence that it will not again be used recklessly.
Third, no amount of Western political "pressure" will restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian rule. Moscow's recognition of the entities as independent is surely a prelude to their incorporation, sooner or later, into the Russian Federation. This step would likely receive overwhelming endorsement in free referendums by the Abkhaz and Ossetians, while the dispossessed Georgians will have no say. Wars have consequences, usually bad, that diplomacy cannot rectify.
Finally, the current Georgian leadership will pay the price at home for its failed venture. While the embattled Saakashvili has the titular support of all political factions at the moment, the jockeying is already under way to replace him. Georgia's first and second presidents were forcibly removed from office. Politics are pitiless, and Georgian politics more so.
Georgia today needs its U.S. patron as never before, but any future U.S. administration will certainly impose tighter controls and more conditions on its help. The rhetoric from Washington will doubtless be supportive of Georgia, but no patron state enjoys the feeling that the tail has wagged the dog, especially against its own advice and interests.
E. Wayne Merry is a former State Department and Pentagon official and now a senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
