Oct 21, 2008 7:42 AM

Inside Afghanistan's Implosion

Last week, I posted a series of vignettes from my recent embed with the Marines in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, the classic ‘soda straw’ view. But it’s important to return to the bigger picture — and to Noah’s earlier question – exactly how screwed are we in Afghanistan? Take a look at the recent headlines. Just […]

Last week, I posted a series of vignettes from my recent embed with the Marines in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, the classic ‘soda straw’ view. But it’s important to return to the bigger picture – and to
Noah’s earlier question – exactly how screwed are we in Afghanistan?

Take a look at the recent headlines. Just over the past few days, the Taliban stopped civilian buses in Kandahar province and executed over two dozen riders. In Kabul, aid worker Gayle Williams was killed in a drive-by; Humayun Shah Asifi, a former presidential candidate and relative of the late king, was abducted in the center of town.

The most unsettling news, for me at least, was the report of a suicide attack that killed two German soldiers and five children in Kunduz province, once the most quiet and secure corner of Afghanistan. What the hell happened? Four years ago, I felt comfortable enough hiring a pickup truck to drive from Kabul to
Kunduz. Today, I don’t think I would chance it.

In the fall and early winter of 2004, I traveled pretty widely outside the capital, usually by road. And Kabul felt, well, reasonably safe. You could walk everywhere, and with knowledge of a little Dari, flag down a taxi or visit a chaikhana. Not today: the foreigners are hunkered down inside their guesthouses.

Outside Kabul, the situation looks even more bleak. You hear regular reports of illegal roadblocks on the highways; attacks on police checkpoints; and constant ambushes. As the Financial Times reported this summer, supplies at some bases became dangerously low because of insurgent attacks on fuel convoys.

So, is the Taliban about to encircle Kabul? Joanna Nathan of the International
Crisis Group recently published a perceptive article that suggests that, whether or not they control territory, the Taliban is winning the war of perceptions:

An insurgency is at its heart a battle of wills and staying power, not of military might. Insurgents in Afghanistan appreciate this and have created a sophisticated propaganda operation that both targets what is seen as weakening support back in foreign capitals and seeks to mold perceptions among the Afghan population.

Coalition forces have provoked a fair amount of public outrage in
Afghanistan for their reliance on airstrikes. In parallel, Taliban have targeted journalists to control their message, Nathan argues:

All in all, the Taliban are successfully driving the news agenda and creating a perception of a movement far stronger and more omnipresent than it really is... And their methods to control the message go beyond those of your typical press office: Community leaders and journalists who might speak up are cowed with threats or worse.
While the Taliban use their media operation to highlight civilian casualties caused by foreign forces, they also deliberately target civilians – as with the recent murder of three Western women aid workers and their Afghan colleague just an hour from Kabul.

As Nathan points out, many of the Taliban attacks are against “soft” (i.e., non-military) targets: aid workers, local officials, civilians who work for the coalition. These attacks have fewer consequences than attacking military patrols, and pay dividends in terms of headlines.

Still, the pessimism in Kabul was genuine. An Afghan acquaintance described to me how his family was scaling back their modest business plans. They rode out the Taliban years in Iran, but returned to start over after the collapse of the regime. "We aren’t investing in Afghanistan anymore," he said with resignation. "It’s too much uncertainty."

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