Gallery: Killer Drones, Stealth Jets, Spy Planes: Bob Gates' Legacy in Military Tech
01mrap
On his way out the door at the Pentagon, Robert Gates leveled with the military. A staggering $700 billion in defense R&D and gear since 9/11 led to only "[relatively modest gains in actual military capability](http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4827)," Gates said on June 2. No giant robots, jet packs or sharks with lasers. But in a way, that made Gates' job easier, since the arch-realist was never about military fantasies, anyway. As Defense Secretary, Gates protected the military's huge budgets for four and a half years. But while he did, he took a firm aim at popping the military's fantasy bubbles that inhibited durable technological and martial innovation. He tried to reboot what the military buys around a simple principle: reality. That is, buy what's immediately relevant for troops fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what will be relevant to those facing the most likely threats of the future. That's meant blast-proof trucks, intelligence gear and radio frequency jammers, not giant planes that shoot laser beams. He'd be the first to say he's had mixed results. Thursday is Gates' final day as secretary of defense. His technological legacy is a dual one: not just an explosion of robots and whole new commands for online warfare, but a junkyard full of military futurism that was archaic when he first stepped into the building. Gates can't know if history will vindicate his perception of the threats the military is most likely to confront. But while the self-styled realist cut a lot of cherished military programs, a reflection on the military tech he favored -- and disfavored -- shows that he was mostly out to cut back on cherished military fantasies. Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles ---------------------------------------- One of Gates' biggest successes comes from an uncomfortable vehicle that happens to save lives. The hull of the MRAP is shaped like a V, so it deflects and absorbs energy from a bomb blast better than a standard Humvee. Buying MRAPs for the bomb-packed roads of Iraq would be a no-brainer, right? Not for the military, which fretted about having *too many* MRAPs at the *end* of the wars. A dumbfounded Gates went outside the typical Pentagon procurement process to surge them into Iraq and Afghanistan at the torrid rate of [over 1000 per month](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-10/ff_smartlist_gates?currentPage=all#), culminating in a whopping 27,000 of them purchased. With homemade bombs surging as well in Afghanistan, Gates' MRAP push saved the lives and limbs of [thousands](http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2011-06-27-gates-mraps-troops_n.htm) of soldiers and Marines. *Photo: U.S. Army*
SSgt Shawn Weismiller02the-intelligence-surge
The Intelligence Surge ---------------------- The plane is basically an old-school executive jet -- not exactly an obvious omen for an oncoming fleet of eyes and ears in the sky. But the [King Air C-12 turboprop plane](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/executive-plane-becomes-flying-spy-in-afghanistan/) was front and center in an unprecedented push to bring more and better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tools into Iraq and Afghanistan. Alongside the MRAP push, the ISR Surge is one of Gates' biggest tech achievements. The C-12 might have had a '70s vintage. But it also had other things Gates wanted: It was cheap and reconfigurable. In 2008, after hearing commanders say they needed way more eyes and ears on the wars, Gates convened an "[ISR Task Force](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49639)" to dodge cumbersome bureaucratic rules and speed spy tools to Iraq and Afghanistan. Armed with [over a billion dollars in emergency cash](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50747), the Pentagon purchased everything from [small Shadow drones](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/wired/archive/13.06/drones.html) to blimps and aerostats to 30 manned C-12s, all packed with sensors, cameras and video recorders. The C-12s, which flew [300 combat missions in Iraq alone by 2009](http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09/airforce_gates_090109w/), were part of a purchasing effort Gates called Project Liberty. They were just the beginning. In just two years, Gates [more than quadrupled the number of spy drone air patrols over Iraq and Afghanistan](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-10/ff_smartlist_gates?currentPage=all). Combat bases started getting cheap, fat mascots: [aerostats loaded with cameras](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/04/cameras-spy-balloons-surge-in-afghanistan/) tethered to base towers, increasing their field of vision. All that imagery can be deadly. In Iraq, a secret task force called ODIN used its overhead surveillance of insurgents from drones, C-12s and helicopters to help kill or capture [hundreds of bomb-planters](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/drone-copter-te/). A secret program developed by the National Security Agency, called [Real Time Regional Gateway made processing the info collected from the ISR Surge much faster, and](http://books.simonandschuster.com/Obama's-Wars/Bob-Woodward/9781439172490/excerpt_with_id/16974) [added cellphone location tracking](http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=4778899) to the mix. And it hasn't just been gadgetry that's added to the intelligence picture: The Army's [Human Terrain System](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/human-terrain-unqualified/) tried, with uneven results, to embed social scientists in combat units to understand the foreign cultures it was fighting amongst. The ISR Surge has now entered a second phase, with what the Air Force calls "[wide-area airborne surveillance](https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=a430a19078cc2da67250de2a193cc98c&tab=core&_cview=1)" -- the ability to stare at huge swaths of territory from the skies with a single mechanism. Its "[Gorgon Stare](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/air-forces-all-seeing-eye-flops-vision-test/)" camera suite, placed underneath a Reaper drone, takes pictures of "city-size" areas and shoots video down to a ground station. But already, the influx of eyes and ears has been so successful that it's led to an ironic consequence: information overload. Programs like Darpa's "[thinking camera](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/beyond-surveillance-darpa-wants-a-thinking-camera/)" are now trying to pre-filter information collected from all the cameras, sensors and videos so analysts get only what they need, so they're not staring at what's become known as "[Death TV](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/9/drone-footage-overwhelming-analysts/print/)" all day long. And to think -- the lowly C-12 was at the fore of the surge. *Photo: U.S. Air Force*
Lance Cheung03the-killer-drones
The Killer Drones ----------------- Drone warfare hardly started under Gates' tenure at the Pentagon. But in 2007, shortly after he arrived, it accelerated to a whole new level. That's when the Air Force began flying the Reaper drone above Afghanistan. The Reaper is a Predator drone on steroids, able to fly [twice as high](http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405), three times as fast, and carrying [eight times more Hellfire missiles and smart bombs](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-27-reaper-afghanistan_N.htm). All of a sudden the military had a whole new option against terrorists in places it couldn't invade. From 2004 to 2007, Predators launched merely nine strikes into Pakistan. The upgraded drones turned that into a full-fledged shadow war, with 33 strikes in 2008, rising to a stunning [118 in 2010](http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones). Those drones are now patrolling [Yemen](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/05/first-drone-strikes-since-bin-laden-raid-hit-pakistan-yemen/) and [Libya](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/04/the-robot-war-over-libya-has-already-begun/) (though the drones hunting Moammar Gadhafi's men are Predators, not Reapers). The drones are only getting more advanced. By 2018, the Navy should have one that can [take off and land on an aircraft carrier](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/04/navy-wants-mouse-click-flying-for-its-carrier-based-drone/) at the click of a mouse. The third generation of the Predator, the [stealthy Avenger](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/07/killer-drones-get-stealthy/), is on its way, and can stay aloft for at least 6 hours longer than the Reaper. That's enough time to think long and hard about outsourcing assassination to robots flown remotely, halfway around the world. *Photo: U.S. Air Force*
Senior Airman Clay Lancaster04f-22
F-22 Raptor ----------- Before 2009, if you asked the Air Force brass what its future was, you'd have heard a lot about the F-22 Raptor. The fighter pilots at the helm of the service believed that the stealthy fighter jet, with its aircraft-destroying missiles, essentially guaranteed U.S. dominance of the skies for decades to come. For years, they said the Air Force [needed 381 of them](http://washingtonindependent.com/30483/how-to-game-the-f-22-fight). At least. But when Gates looked at the plane, he saw a $250 million aircraft that [wasn't even flying in Iraq or Afghanistan](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/02/gates/). He capped the F-22 at 187 jets in 2009 -- which, to the Air Force, was synonymous with killing it. His counteroffer to Air Force futurists: the Joint Strike Fighter, a family of fighter planes shared with the Navy and Marines, and a flying armada worth of drones. *Photo: U.S. Air Force*
Andy Wolfe05f-35
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ------------------------- One of the ways Gates sold his cuts to the F-22 was by pointing out that another stealth jet, the F-35, would do [everything the F-22 could do but better](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/ask-bob-gates-a/). "Better," in this case, meant that it wouldn't just be an Air Force plane: The Navy and the Marines could use it too. What a bargain, right? Wrong. Whatever the merits of the F-35, it's literally the most expensive defense program in human history, with costs [edging over $1 trillion](http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/06/06/357560/f-35-strikes-trillion-dollar-mark-for-maintenance-bills.html) for the anticipated purchase, operation and maintenance of 2,443 planes. Gates has [sacked the program's chief](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/02/gates-sacks-stealth-jet-chief-blasts-troubling-record-of-crucial-plane/) and put the Marine variant on a [two year timeout](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/shrinkage-gates-cuts-army-marine-corps-size/). Things have improved; test flights have ramped up. Nevertheless, the Joint Strike Fighter may go down as the biggest donnybrook of Gates' time at the Pentagon. It almost makes you long for the good ol' F-22. *Photo: U.S. Navy Aviation*
06future-combat-systems
Future Combat Systems --------------------- Can't figure out what something called "Future Combat Systems" is supposed to do? Congratulations: You've got something in common with the military's top brass. Future Combat Systems was the smorgasbord of Army programs: a series of armored vehicles, sensors, data links, ground robots, cannons, even wearable computers for dismounted soldiers. Developed before the Iraq war, the Army kept adding stuff on to it, its chief of staff [admitted](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/army-promises-our-new-future-wont-creep/), as insurgent bombs kept blowing up lightly armored tanks. The result was an unaffordable $200 billion mess. Gates had enough in 2009. He cancelled the eight vehicles that formed the [heart of the Future Combat Systems](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/gates-rips-hear/), forcing the Army to go back to its future. Its next new vehicle? Pretty much [a blank slate](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/the-armys-future-vehicle-whatever-you-want-it-to-be/) -- just one that can't cost more than $18 billion. *Photo: U.S. Army*
07helicopters-for-afghanistan
Helicopters for Afghanistan --------------------------- There's nothing futuristic about Chinooks, Black Hawks, Sea Knights or other helicopters that the Army and Marine Corps have used for decades. But it took Gates to recognize that they were desperately needed in Afghanistan. Gates surged hundreds of helicopters into the war, where the rugged terrain and lack of major airfields limited the utility of fixed-wing planes. From [combat aviation](http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/ap_CABdeployment_121908/) to [medical evacuation](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/washington/28military.html), helicopters had to fill the gap. One result: to get wounded troops to field hospitals [within an hour](http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123256862) of their injuries. *Photo: U.S. Army*
Cpl. Nathan McCord08jammers
Jammers ------- In 2007, shortly after Gates arrived at the Pentagon, the United States won a battle in the war against against homemade bombs, the signature weapon of the Iraq insurgency. Under Gates, the military looked to turn that victory into a full-fledged rout. Militants used everything from garage door openers to cordless telephones to detonate their bombs from afar, keeping the triggermen safe from counterattack. An influx of radio frequency jammers pushed the improvised explosive device back to the technological stone age, and exposed the dudes who tried to set them off. Rather than try to find the specific frequencies, as earlier generations of jammers had, a device called a CVRJ [quadrupled the number of simultaneous channels the jammers were capable of stopping](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/iraqs-invisible-war/all/1), and doubled their spectral coverage. Better yet, it spoofed the protocols the phone-triggers used to set off their bombs -- and was tailorable for specific kinds of bombs. Gates' Pentagon bought thousands of them, and casualties from the bombs dropped dramatically. But the war against improvised explosive devices is nowhere near over. Low-tech bombs, set off by command wire and using little-detectable metals, are all over Afghanistan. The Pentagon is sponsoring the development of a high-end jammer that can block electronic emissions from anything from a drone to a warship. But there's little end in sight for the cruder deadly bombs. *Photo: U.S. Marine Corps*
09expeditionary-fighting-vehicle
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle ---------------------------------- One day, when the wars end, the Marines won't be a second U.S. land army. When that day comes, the Corps insists, they'll need an updated, armored vehicle to take them from a ship to a beach while under fire. Just one problem: It spent nearly 20 years and $3 billion just to get to a testable version of its Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle -- which carried an estimated price tag of [another $13 billion](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/is-this-the-end-for-the-marines-swimming-tank/). Oh, and its light armor made it vulnerable to shoreside homemade bombs. Gates finally gave the so-called "swimming tank" the budgetary heave-ho in January. But it didn't come without massive angst in the Corps, which felt that killing the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was a prelude to abandoning amphibious warfare, the life's blood of the Marines. Gates won the battle. But no sooner did he win than the Corps began talking about a new amphibious vehicle that sounds [suspiciously like the old swimming tank](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/marines-next-swimming-tank-may-look-reeaally-familiar/). *Photo: U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command*
10social-media
Social Media ------------ To say the military has enjoyed an iffy relationship with online communication is an understatement. Milblogging without prior approval from a superior was [against official Army rules](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/05/new_army_rules_/). Back when people still used MySpace, the Defense Department [kept its people off it](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/05/military_defend/). The internet looked more like a [security risk than an outreach tool](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/05/in-late-january/), even as some [top generals](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01/tf-mountains-so) thought the world's mightiest military didn't need to [cower in fear from blogging](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/05/leading-general/). As recently as 2009, the military was considering a *total* [ban on social networking sites](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/07/military-may-ban-twitter-facebook-as-security-headaches/). But then Gates sided with his first social-media guru, Price Floyd, who argued that if the military wasn't using Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and YouTube to get its messages out, others would fill the information vacuum -- and not necessarily with friendly material. Still, it might be too little, too late. The heyday of milblogging is years passed, although the same can be said of blogging in general. And since Floyd left last year, the Pentagon feels a lot less blogger-friendly. But Gates' communications shop swears that social media are [forever safe for the military](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/tweet-away-troops-pentagon-wont-ban-social-media/). And there's been an explosion of social media usage: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs [can't stop tweeting](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/top-officer-fears-cyberwar-hearts-karzai-tweets-with-help/), and senior officers have [corny Twitter accounts](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/general-fail-the-militarys-worst-tweeters/). (But seriously, follow [@NavyNews](http://www.twitter.com/navynews).) *Photo: U.S. Army*
11airborne-laser
Airborne Laser -------------- The Airborne Laser sounds like something Dr. Evil dreamed up. You take a Boeing 747, pack a megawatt-class chemical laser into a disco ball on its nose cone, and use it to shoot down frickin' ballistic missiles. Exceptionally cool, right? Sadly, it doesn't work, despite [$4 billion](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/budget-latest/) spent testing it. Gates thought he gave the axe to the laser in 2009. But its friends on the Hill, enamored with the idea of a "flying lightsaber" that swats missiles, kept throwing it back into the budget. Still, Gates' diligence at killing the zombie weapon has gotten it down to one lonely test plane -- and its latest tests [haven't gone well.](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/missile-beats-flying-lightsaber-in-crucial-test/) Worry not, laser fans: The Pentagon has got a whole bunch of other ray gun projects, including a particularly promising one that's already [using coherent to set boats on fire](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/04/video-navy-laser-sets-ship-on-fire/). Take that, Dr. Evil. *Photo: U.S. Missile Defense Agency*
12littoral-combat-ship
The Littoral Combat Ship ------------------------ Gates wasn't shy about cutting the Navy's surface ships. He slowed the production of aircraft carriers, and shifted from hulking, gazillion-dollar DDG-1000 destroyers to the smaller, cheaper DDG-51s. But he *loved* one surface combatant, the Littoral Combat Ship, a fast ship designed to fight close to shore -- or, as Gates called it, "[a key capability for presence, stability and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions](http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396)." The Navy is slated to buy 55 of 'em, and make the ships the backbone of tomorrow's fleet. But there are lots of problems with the Littoral Combat Ship. It's come in [way over budget](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/04/littoral-combat/). More fundamentally, its [light armor makes it rocket bait](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/navys-new-warship-bargain-death-trap-or-both/). It would rather travel fast than be overburdened with deck guns. A blogger at the U.S. Naval Institute took a look at its potential survivability in a fight and called it an "[abomination](http://blog.usni.org/2011/01/02/the-lcs-is-not-expected-to-be-survivable-in-a-hostile-combat-environment/)." The Littoral Combat Ship is a long way from [being used in combat](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/while-libya-rages-navy-sends-its-newest-warship-to-san-diego/). It may be years before we know whether Gates' favorite ship becomes the future of surface warfare -- or ends up getting sunk by insurgents firing a couple cheap rockets. *Photo: U.S. Navy*
Tech. Sgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr13cyber-command
U.S. Cyber Command ------------------ The military has a *lot* of paranoid anxieties about hackers tearing its information networks apart. Its equivalent of Paxil is found at Fort Meade, Maryland, in a new -- and [very vague](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/foggy-future-for-militarys-new-cyber-command/) -- organization called U.S. Cyber Command. Ordered into existence by Gates in 2009, [Cyber Command](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/it-begins-militarys-cyberwar-command-is-fully-operational/) is supposed to defend military networks from hostile infiltration. At least that's the most public description of what the command will do. Booting hostile servers off-line? [Who knows](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/pentagons-prospective-cyber-commander-talks-terms-of-digital-warfare/). Its leadership vows to have [nearly no role](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/militarys-cyber-commander-swears-no-role-on-civilian-networks/) in protecting the civilian, commercial internet. But in the fall, Gates penned an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security outlining circumstances where [Cyber Command could get involved](http://stag-komodo.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/doc-of-the-day-nsa-dhs-trade-players-for-net-defense/) if other defenses are overwhelmed. Looks like Ft. Meade may wind up being Paxil for more than just the military. *Photo: U.S. Air Force*
